2026 Texas Election Security Update

Ballot box Election security is a top priority for the Texas Secretary of State’s office. We continue to employ effective and forward-thinking security measures to further strengthen our state’s elections systems and safeguard our elections infrastructure against any malicious activity. As always, our Elections and Information Technology officials work tirelessly to ensure that every eligible Texas voter can cast a ballot with confidence.

Texas strength comes from its decentralized nature. On election day, Texas doesn’t have one election taking place – Texas has 254 separate elections. All elections are conducted locally with local election officials making determinations on the type of equipment used and methods of voting. Furthermore, while results are reported to the Secretary of State’s office, all election results are tabulated locally and maintained by local election officials.

Election security in Texas is successful due to its comprehensive, start-to-finish approach that includes: security training & preparedness, equipment certification requirements, pre-election testing, chain-of-custody best practices, post-election auditing, and transparency through poll watcher service and public testing.

Election Security in Past Elections

There is no evidence that any voting or voter registration systems in Texas were compromised before the 2016 Election or in any subsequent elections.
The Department of Homeland Security offered a statement reiterating this fact in 2018.
The Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security in a joint report found no evidence that foreign government interfered with the 2020 elections.
Following the 2024 elections, CISA’s then-director issued a statement that “our election infrastructure has never been more secure” and reiterated that there is no evidence that malicious activity has impacted elections.

Election Safeguards at the Secretary of State’s Office

The Texas Secretary of State’s office has established effective communication protocols with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), the Department of Public Safety (DPS), and the Department of Information Resources (DIR) to coordinate cybersecurity monitoring and response.
In 2020, The SOS utilized Help America Vote Act (HAVA) funds to pay for all 254 counties to receive a security assessment to determine they cyber and physical security needs. In 2025, the Texas Legislature appropriated additional funds so that the SOS may conduct another round of Election Security Assessments.
All individuals that access our Statewide Voter Registration and Election Management System are required to complete annual cybersecurity training provided by the state to maintain access to the system. All users to the system must utilize multi-factor authentication to ensure that only those who are authorized to do so can gain access to the statewide voter registration database. (TGC § 2063.104, TAC § 477)
Any breach of cybersecurity that impacts election data is to be reported to the Secretary of State, the Texas Cyber Command, and to the standing committee of each house of the legislature with jurisdiction over elections. TXCC provides guidance and access to an Incident Response Team as needed. ( TGC § 2063.302)
The Texas Secretary of State’s office contracts with a third-party vendor to provide Dark Web Monitoring Services that passively monitors the dark web for cybersecurity risks to the agency, its third-party vendors, and all 254 county election offices.
In light of statutory changes as well as administrative considerations, on September 1, 2026, the Texas Secretary of State’s office suspended certification for several voting systems or voting system components. Certifications were suspended for voting systems that:

Are not capable of performing hash validation in accordance with SB1 87(2);
Contain direct recording electronic (DRE) components, prohibited by SB 598 89(R); or
Are legacy systems no longer in use by any jurisdiction in Texas.

Working with Local, State, and Federal Partners

Federal

Since, 2017, the SOS along with county election officials have participated in numerous tabletop exercises on election security provided by various organizations including Department of Homeland Security, CISA, and others.
In January 2026, Texas procured a statewide Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) membership to cover all state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) government entities. Under this membership, all eligible election offices and officials receive a no-cost membership in both the MS-ISAC and the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC). Within this model, most Texas counties participate in the EI-ISAC to ensure that the elections community is effectively sharing relevant and timely information with respect to safeguarding our elections and being aware of potential cyber threats.

State

The Texas Homeland Security Strategic Plan 2026-2030 (PDF) Election Security objective guides statewide effort to improve interagency and cross-jurisdictional election security preparedness and response. The 2021-2025 THSSP had a single Election Security priority action, “ensure the integrity of Texas elections by protecting electoral systems against compromise or interference.” The 2026-2030 THSSP expanded this to its own objective with four new and more detailed priority actions focusing on cybersecurity, physical security, multi-level coordination, and training/exercises.
The THSSP 2026-2030 added a 6th Goal to “develop and enhance the enabling capabilities needed to support statewide efforts across all homeland security mission areas.” Efforts in this area will ensure that elections continue to be run by a skilled and experienced workforce with the knowledge and resources needed to achieve that goal.
HB 150 (89R) transferred the Department of Information Resources' (DIR's) cybersecurity functions to the Texas Cyber Command (TXCC). TXCC now serves as the state’s single, focused authority for cybersecurity functions, strengthening statewide cybersecurity operations.

Local

The SOS provides on-going training opportunities for county election officials at our annual seminars, during regional trainings, over webinars, and on an individual basis, as needed, to county election officials. Additionally, security plan templates are available to counties upon request to review and update their individual security preparedness.
All individuals that access our Statewide Voter Registration and Election Management System are required to complete annual cybersecurity training provided by the state to maintain access to the system. All users to the system must utilize multi-factor authentication to ensure that only those who are authorized to do so can gain access to the statewide voter registration database. (TGC § 2063.104, TAC § 477)
All individuals who work for local government entities, including local elections offices, are required to complete annual cybersecurity training provided by the local authority to standards established by Texas Cyber Command. (TGC § 2063.103)
As mentioned, the Texas Secretary of State’s office contracts with a third-party vendor to provide Dark Web Monitoring Services that passively monitors the dark web for cybersecurity risks to the agency, its third-party vendors, and all 254 county election offices.
In 2025, the Texas Legislature appropriated additional funds so that the SOS may conduct another round of Election Security Assessments for all 254 counties to further evaluate cyber and physical security needs.

Misinformation, Disinformation, and Mal-Information

Definitions:

Misinformation is false information that is shared inadvertently, without meaning to cause harm.
Disinformation is fabricated or deliberately manipulated content intentionally shared to harm or deceive.
Mal-information is deliberately released sensitive or private information with altered context.

misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation diagram

If voters or election officials come across information related to voting that is inaccurate, misleading or incorrect, please report that to the Secretary of State as we have established communication lines with various social media organizations and law enforcement agencies that can assist in removing incorrect information regarding elections.
The Texas Secretary of State’s office recommends as best practice that local election offices designate an official source or channel for information to mitigate any misinformation or disinformation campaigns. Consistently redirect members of the public and media to the official source for information or updates.

Legislative Efforts to Prioritize Election Security

HB 1421 (86th Legislative Session) added Chapter 279 “Cybersecurity of Elections Systems” to the Texas Election Code. This legislation implemented many of the recommendations in the SOS Report to the Texas Legislature on Election Cybersecurity Preparedness. This new chapter has resulted in the following:

The Secretary of State issued an Election Security Best Practices Guide, which defines classes of protected election data and identifies best practices related to the security of election systems.
HB 3834 (86th Legislative Session) Requires that all individuals that access our Statewide Voter Registration and Election Management System complete annual security training to maintain access to the system.
HB 3834 (86th Legislative Session) Requires that all individuals who work in local elections offices complete annual cybersecurity training provided by the local authority.
Any breach of cybersecurity that impacts election data is to be reported to the Secretary of State and to the standing committee of each house of the legislature with jurisdiction over elections.
All County Election Offices are required to undergo an Election Security Assessment (ESA).

In accordance with HB 4130 (86th Legislative Session), the Secretary of State conducts a certification program related to electronic pollbooks. Under this provision the Secretary of State prescribes functional and technical standards regarding functionality and security of electronic pollbooks. Our office released Advisory 2023-12 which explains the specific standards adopted to meet this requirement.
SB 1 (87th Legislative Session, Second Called Session) added requirements relating to the posting of peace officers at central counting stations, and requirements relating to the video recording and livestreaming of all areas containing voted ballots in Texas counties with a population of at least 100,000.
In accordance with SB 1 (87th Legislative Session, Second Called Session) the Texas Secretary of State’s Elections Division Audit Program conducts in-depth reviews and examinations of election records and documents maintained by county election officials to ensure election law and security procedures have been properly followed.
SB 1 (87th Legislative Session, Second Called Session) added a requirement that a hash validation must be performed during the pre-election testing of the voting system for each election. The hash validation process is designed to verify that the software of the system has not been altered or manipulated, and that the software is the same software that was tested and certified by the federal government and the State of Texas. Our office released Advisory 2022-30 and 2019-23, which explain the process for performing a hash validation.
SB 598 (87th Legislative Session, Regular Session) provides for auditable voting systems in Texas, authorizes reimbursement for retrofitting of Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems purchased since September 2014, and creates a risk-limiting audit program.

Beginning September 1, 2026, DRE voting systems may not be used if they do not contain a voter verifiable paper audit trail.
Requires that voting systems be “auditable voting systems.” An auditable voting system is defined as a voting system that uses, creates, or displays a paper record that may be read by the voter, also referred to as Voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT), and is not capable of being connected to the Internet or any other computer network or electronic device.
As of August 31, 2026, risk-limiting audits are required for elections containing a race or measure that is voted statewide. In accordance with SB 598 and prior to implementation, the Texas Secretary of State’s Elections Division conducted a Risk Limiting Audit pilot program with over 200 counties having participated.
Beginning September 1, 2026, voting systems may not be capable of being connected to any external or internal network communications.

SB 271 (88th Legislative Session, Regular Session) requires local governments to report to state officials when they experience certain security incidents, including security breaches and ransomware attacks. If the incident involves election data, the local government must notify the Secretary of State of the incident.
SB 1661 (88th Legislative Session, Regular Session) provides that an authority operating a central counting station may only use or purchase a ballot scan system if the system is only capable of using a data transfer device that (1) once a cast vote record is written, is incapable of being modified without automatic detection of the modification and rejection of the cast vote record and (2) does not allow for the process to be overridden or circumvented.
SB 2166 (89th Legislative Session, Regular Session) modifies the requirements for conducting the Public Logic and Accuracy Test and the Tabulation Testing for electronic voting system equipment. Requires Logic and Accuracy Testing for electronic pollbook systems.
SB 2216 (89th Legislative Session, Regular Session) requires that equipment used in the operation of a voting system be stored in a locked room. Provides that the inventory of electronic information storage media must include information on the polling location at which the storage media will be used. Requires the general custodian of election records to place security seals on each unit of voting system equipment to prevent unauthorized access to the equipment. Further requires the general custodian of election records to create a procedure for documenting which specific seals are placed on each unit of voting system equipment and any instance where the seals are removed, including the identity of the individual who removed the seals and the purpose for accessing the equipment.
SB 1540 (89th Legislative Session, Regular Session) expands the list of individuals eligible for confidentiality protections to include a current or former election official, or employee, volunteer, or designee of an election official, or an employee of the Secretary of State’s office who performs duties related to elections.
SB 2217 (89th Legislative Session, Regular Session) amends several sections of the Election Code related to election practices and procedures, including updated requirements for post-election reporting requirements for electronic pollbooks and voting systems.
SB 827 (89th Legislative Session, Regular Session) renames the Partial Manual Count to the Post-Election Hand Count Audit, and modifies the procedures for conducting the count for a more robust audit. Modifies requirements and timelines for performing the Post-Election Hand Count Audit and Risk-Limiting Audit in elections in which a risk-limiting audit is performed. Our office released Advisory 2025-21 to explain the changes to the Post-Election Hand Count Audit.

Requires the hand count audit of early voting locations and election day locations to be conducted by polling location rather than by precinct, but still requires ballots by mail to be counted by precinct. The count will be conducted in at least one percent of election day polling locations and early voting locations, or in three locations, whichever is greater. For ballots by mail, the count will be performed for at least one percent of the precincts in which a ballot by mail was cast, or in three precincts, whichever is greater.

SB 2753 (89th Legislative Session, Regular Session) makes several changes to the Election Code integrating Early Voting by Personal Appearance and Election Day. These changes will apply to an election ordered on or after the date that the Secretary of State releases a report on the implementation of the bill’s procedures. Our office released Advisory 2025-10 summarizing the requirements of SB 2753 and the procedural changes relating to the implementation of those requirements.

Removes the gap between the early voting period and election day to establish a single voting period.
Requires election day results and early voting results to be reported together as in person voting results, and eliminates the separate reporting categories. Ballot by mail results are still reported separately from in person voting results.
Allows the same set of voting system equipment to be used for both early voting and election day.
Requires election results to be reported by precinct, and reported by polling location.
Requires early voting clerks to secure voting machines at the end of each day and unsecure them before the next day of voting begins.

Current Safeguards in Texas Law & Election Procedure

No voting system is ever connected to the internet at any point - either when votes are being cast or when they are being counted. As of September 1, 2026, a voting system may not be capable of being connected to any external or internal communications network, including the internet. (Sec. 129.054, Texas Election Code)
Only software certified by the Texas Secretary of State through the Voting System Examination and Certification process can be loaded on a computer used for counting or accumulating vote totals. (Sec. 129.055, Texas Election Code)
The Texas Secretary of State prescribes the specific requirements and standards for the certification of an electronic device used to accept voters as part of the Electronic Pollbook Certification Program. All electronic pollbooks must undergo the annual recertification process. (Sec. 31.014, Texas Election Code)
After the acquisition of a new, certified voting system, election officials must conduct hash validation and hardware diagnostic testing on every component of the voting system as part of acceptance testing. (Sec. 129.021 & Sec. 129.022, Texas Election Code)
Background checks are required for all personnel that prepare, test or service all voting system equipment. (Sec. 129.051, Texas Election Code)
Current or former election officials, or employees, volunteers, or designees of an election official, or employees of the Secretary of State’s office who performs duties related to elections are eligible for confidentiality protections. (Sec. 552.1175, Texas Government Code)
All individuals that access our Statewide Voter Registration and Election Management System are required to complete annual cybersecurity training provided by the state to maintain access to the system. All users to the system must utilize multi-factor authentication to ensure that only those who are authorized to do so can gain access to the statewide voter registration database. (TGC § 2063.104, TAC § 477)
All individuals who work in local elections offices are required to complete annual cybersecurity training provided by the local authority to standards established by Texas Cyber Command. (TGC § 2063.104)
Local governments must report to state officials when they experience certain security incidents, including security breaches and ransomware attacks. If the incident involves election data, the local government must notify the Secretary of State of the incident. (TGC § 2063.302)
At all times, equipment used in the operation of a voting system must be stored in a locked room and security seals must be placed on each unit of voting system equipment to prevent unauthorized access. Procedures must be implemented documenting which seals are placed on each unit and any instance where the seals are removed, including the identity of the individual who removed the seals and the purpose for accessing the equipment. (Sec. 123.034, Texas Election Code)
Additional voting system safeguards are outlined in Section 9 of Advisory 2019-23 Electronic Voting System Procedures Advisory.

Pre-Election

All voting systems are tested three times – twice before the machines are used in the election and once immediately after. The tests consist of a deck of ballots being voted on the machines according to a test script. Then the test ballots are tabulated to ensure that the machine results are correct and match the expected results from the test script. The machines cannot be used or deployed until the test is 100% successful. Note that one of the tests conducted before the machines are used in an election is open to the public, and notice of this test is published on the local subdivision’s internet website or bulletin board used for posting notice of meetings. Each political party has the right to submit names of individuals to represent that party on the testing board and thus every county usually has a testing board that consists of at least one person from each political party. (Sec. 129.023 and Subchapter D, Chapter 127, Texas Election Code)
A hash validation is performed as part of the pre-election testing process for the voting system in every election, which is open to the public. The hash validation process allows the entity conducting the election to verify that the software used with the system has not been manipulated or altered, and that the software is the same software that was tested and certified by the federal government and the State of Texas. (Advisory 2022-30; Sec. 129.023(c-1), Texas Election Code)
A logic and accuracy test must be conducted for electronic pollbooks and electronic pollbook systems and peripheral devices used in an election. (Sec. 129.0231, Texas Election Code)
The inventory of electronic information storage media must include information on the polling location at which the storage media will be used. (Sec. 129.051, Texas Election Code)

Early Voting & Election Day

The election worker at the polling place (both during early voting and election day) must confirm that there are zero votes cast at the opening of voting and at the end of voting they must compare the number of ballots cast to the number of voters that have checked-in on the poll list. (Advisory 2019-23, Secs. 61.002, 127.068, Texas Election Code)
Before and after use each day, all voting systems are sealed with locks and with seals with unique serial numbers, and all election workers must follow proper chain of custody procedures during the election, including a careful tracking of the serial numbers used to seal the machines at the end of each period of voting. (Secs. 129.051, 129.053, Texas Election Code)
While voting is occurring, election judges are required to periodically inspect the equipment to ensure there is no tampering or damage to the equipment. (Sec. 125.005, Texas Election Code)
Poll watchers are allowed to observe at all early voting and election day polling locations and at the central counting or accumulation station where ballots are being counted or vote totals accumulated. Poll Watcher duties allow the watcher to follow and observe the delivery of election records from polling locations to the central counting or accumulation station. (Chapter 33, Texas Election Code)
As mentioned, all voting systems are tested three times – twice before the machines are used in the election and once immediately after. (Sec. 129.023 and Subchapter D, Chapter 127, Texas Election Code)
A licensed peace officer must be posted at the central counting station to ensure the security of ballot boxes containing voted ballots throughout the period of tabulation. (Sec. 127.1232, Texas Election Code)
In counties with a population of 100,000 or more, a video surveillance system that retains a record of all areas containing voted ballots must be implemented from the time the voted ballots are delivered to the central counting station, signature verification committee, or early voting ballot board until the canvass of precinct election returns. The video must be available to the public by a livestream. (Sec. 127.1232, Texas Election Code)

Post-Election

As noted above, all voting systems are tested a second time just prior to the automatic tabulation and once more immediately after the automatic tabulation is completed. (Sec. 129.023 and Subchapter D, Chapter 127, Texas Election Code)
After the automatic counting of ballots is completed, the presiding judge of the central counting station must prepare the election returns for each precinct and each polling location and sign the returns to certify their accuracy. The returns may not be certified until a valid automatic count is obtained or a manual count is completed.
A post-election hand count audit is required for all elections that have paper ballots. (Sec. 127.201, Texas Election Code)
As of August 31, 2026, risk-limiting audits are required for elections containing a race or measure that is voted statewide. (Subchapter I, Chapter 127, Texas Election Code)
The Texas Secretary of State’s Elections Division Audit Program conducts in-depth reviews and examinations of election records and documents maintained by county election officials to ensure election law and security procedures have been properly followed. (Sec. 127.351, Texas Election Code)
The Secretary of State has the authority to conduct a manual or electronic recount of any election using electronic voting systems. (Sec. 127.202, Texas Election Code)
All voting systems are required to be auditable voting systems, defined as voting systems that use, create, or display a paper record that may be read by the voter, also referred to as Voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT). (Sec. 129.003, Texas Election Code)
The central accumulator of all voting systems certified for use in Texas include a real-time audit log. All significant election events and their date and time stamps are maintained in the audit log. (Sec. 81.62, Texas Administrative Code)