



# Voting System Certification Evaluation Report

# Hart InterCivic (Hart) Verity Voting System 1.0

# Introduction

This report summarizes the findings and observations regarding the conformance of the Election Hart InterCivic (Hart) Verity Voting System 1.0 to the requirements of the State of Texas.

Pursuant to Texas Administrative Code §81.60, HART submitted their application for state certification. Included with their application was their Technical Data Package (TDP) and the test report upon which the EAC based their national certification. The EAC/NIST NVLAP accredited Voting System Test Laboratory (VSTL) was SLI Global Solutions. The system was evaluated to the 2005 version of the VVSG, see Appendix A - EAC Certificate of Certification.

Verity Voting includes the following components:

- Verity Build Election definition software application
- Verity Central Central scanning software application
- Verity Count Tabulation and reporting software application
- Verity User Management User management software application
- Verity Election Management Data management software application
- Verity Scan Digital scanning voting device
- Verity Touch Writer with Access Ballot marking device, with audio tactile interface

To provide chain-of-custody, a copy of all firmware/software and source code was s sent directly from SLI, the VSTL for this system. It was installed in the early part of the examination under the supervision of the Texas examination team.

The Hart Verity Voting System 1.0 was evaluated for certification by the State of Texas on September 22-23, 2015.

## Recommendation

The Hart Verity Voting System 1.0 is recommended for certification. The system was judged to comply with the voting system requirements of the State of Texas.

Additional observations and recommendations for improvement are also presented in this report.

This recommendation is strengthened by the fact that the system is being successfully used to run elections in other states.





The EAC maintains an interactive map identifying jurisdictions that are using EAC certified systems. They also maintain a report database of problems reported by election officials with certified systems. These resources were consulted as part of the process of preparing this report.

Sincerely,

71 Stephen Bergen

H. Stephen Berger





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# **Candidate System**

This section describes the candidate system, the Hart Verity Voting System 1.0.

## System Components

The system is comprised of the components listed in Table 1 and shown functionally in Figure 1. This information is based on companies "Application for Texas Certification of Voting System" (Form 100).



Figure 1 - Hart Verity Voting System 1.0 Process Flow

		Syster	n Components
#	<b>Unit/Application</b>	Version	Function
	]	Hart Verity	y Voting System 1.0
1	Verity Build	1.0.3	Creates election definitions.
2	Verity Central	1.0.3	High-volume scanner for scanning ballot batches.
3	Verity User Management	1.0.3	User account and access management.
4	Verity Election Management	1.0.3	Election-definition and data loading and management.
5	Verity Desktop	1.0.3	Workstation management software <sup>1</sup>
6	Verity Scan	1.0.3	Scans completed ballots, creating Cast Vote Records (CVRs).
7	Verity Touch Writer with Access	1.0.3	Provides digital voting through a touch screen tablet system or accessibility interface.

#### Table 1 - Hart Verity Voting System 1.0 System Components

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Verity Desktop is required system component but is not described in the operational guide.

### System Limits

Hart reports the system limits recorded in Table 2.

Element	Limit Requirement
Precincts	1,000
Splits per Precinct	20
Total Precincts + Splits in an election	6,000
Districts For voting devices and applications	100
Parties in a General Election	24
Parties in a Primary Election	10
Contests and Propositions combined	200
Contest Choices in a Contest	75
Total Contest Choices (voting positions) in an election	600
Maximum length of contestant name	100 characters
Maximum write-in length	25 characters
Ballot Styles	N/A
Voting Types	5
Maximum Polling Places per election	1200
Maximum devices per election	2400
Maximum number of central count devices	N/A
Media Device – Scan voting device	9999 sheets per vDrive
Media Device – Central application	60000 sheets per vDrive
Number of voters definable per election	1000000
Max. sheets per ballot	4 sheets
Scan - single sheet ballot	9999 Ballots
Scan - two sheet ballot	4999 Ballots
Scan - three sheet ballot	3333 Ballots
Scan – four sheet ballot	2499 Ballots
Central	1000000 Ballots
Count	4000000 CVRs 1200 vDrives

## Table 2 - Hart Verity Voting System 1.0 System Limits<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> EAC Scope of Certification for the Hart Verity 1.0 Voting System.

## **Examination Report**

#### Description of the Examination

The examination occurred on September 22-23, 2015. It was preceded by the delivery of the companies Forms 100 and 101, Technical Data Package, authorization letters and related documents. The system software and firmware was provided directly from the VSTL that had examined the system to the VVSG for national certification.

On the first day of the examination, the technical examiners (Stephen Berger and James Sneeringer), Christina Adkins and some members of the election division staff were present to observe and verify the installation of the vendor's software. The VSTL directly provided encrypted Ghost images for the exam with SHA-256 HASH codes to verify digital signatures of the decrypted files. After the images were decrypted, SHA256 Hash Generator was used to generate the digital signature and confirm that it was the same as the signature provided by the VSTL.

Photos of the equipment and labels were taken and where hardware and firmware versions could be provided either on a screen or printed, those were produced and recorded.

The conclusion of the exam was that the Hart Verity 1.0 meet the Voting System Standards outlined in Sections 122.001, 122.032, 122.033, and 122.0331 of the Texas Election Code and the rules outlined in Chapter 81, Subchapter C of the Texas Administrative Code.

#### **Observations & Further Recommendations**

#### **Corrupted vDrive**

During the original examination a problem with vDrives reported as corrupt by the tabulator prevented successful tabulation of a test election. This flaw resulted in a product advisory being issued by the company on September 30, 2015. The product advisory was followed by a solution being implemented. An engineering change request was submitted to the EAC and approved by the agency on December 4, 2015. The company then notified the Keith Ingram, Texas Director of Elections, of the successful resolution on the problem on December 8, 2015. The recommendation made in this report is based on the system with this change included in the system.

In the product advisory the problem is described as follows:

#### **Issue Description**

In Verity Central, it is possible to create an invalid vDrive that will not be accepted in Verity Count tabulation and reporting software. If this condition is encountered, Count will generate the message, "vDrive format is invalid." The user can recover from this error by rescanning all ballots contained on the affected vDrive. However, this advisory recommends an efficient and usable alternative workflow to avoid the condition altogether.

This issue can be encountered in some Central ballot adjudication workflows if the following conditions exist:

• The election contains a Straight Party Selector

- A contest that is included in the "Straight Party" has a marked write-in which is adjudicated in Verity Central
- Various combinations of additional adjudication actions are performed; an example of a sequence that results in an invalid vDrive is:
  - Resolve the write-in contest
  - **Accept** a voter intent issue in any contest (in Verity Central, "Accept" means to "confirm" the system processing of the mark)
  - **Make any change** to any contest on the ballot (i.e. manually check or uncheck a choice, using the software, to classify it as marked or not marked)

Different combinations of the actions above, as well as other adjudication action, can generate an invalid vDrive. Because these actions can occur in different sequences, and because they can also be preceded or followed by additional actions, it is not possible to specify a single workflow that will result in the invalid condition; other sequences of steps can also result in the invalid condition. After these steps have been performed and the ballot containing the resolved write-in has its Cast Vote Records (CVRs) written to a vDrive, the vDrive that contains this ballot will not be accepted in Verity Count. When the vDrive is read into Count, Count will generate the message, "vDrive format is invalid."

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ege 🕶 Safety 🕶 Tools 🕶 🔞 🕶 🔉	) B 8						
			Welcome Pam Cardenas Main Menu New COs Approved COs Components Systems Help Logout				
_		۲	ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION				
			Change Order Details				
Manufacturer's CO	ECO-01145		Change Order Date 11/12/15				
Manufacture	Hart InterCivic		VSTL SLI Global 5	olutions			
Titl	Verity Database Column Update, To Add	ress Verity Cent	ral 1.0.3 Product Advisory Notice				
Descriptio	To address the Product Advisory notice	distributed on S	eptember 30, 2015, Hart InterCivic wants to make a change to the software installation pr	ocedure for Verity Central 1.0.3.			
			Documents				
1. 4005557-REVA - Ver 2. 4005557-REVB - Ver 3. 4005559-REVA - Ver 4. 4005559-REVN - Ver 5. 6673-001-REVB - Ve 6. SLI DeMin Evaluatio 7. SQL Workflow.pdf 8. Verity Central 1.0.3	1. 400557-/BIVA - Verly Central 1.0.3 De Hinimis Change Request.pdf 2. 4005557-BIVA - Verly Central 1.0.3 De Hinimis Change Request.pdf 3. 4005557-BIVA - Verly Central 1.0.3 De Hinimis Test Report.pdf 4. 600 - Central 1.0.3 De Hinimis Test Report.pdf 4. 607 - Central 1.0.3 De Hinimis Test Report.pdf 5. 607						
			Approvals				
	VSTL Approved?	Yes	Approved By Santos	Date 12/01/15			
	EAC Approved?	Yes	Approved By Hancock	Date 12/04/15			
			Systems/Components/Versions				
1 Verity 1 0/3005307	Varity Central Workstation /1.0.3				_		
a very noy soussur	Terry centre Portetation, 2.0.5						
			Back				
			Application created and maintained by the Election Assistance Commission				

Figure 2 - EAC Approval of Change Correcting the vDrive Problem

While the problem itself was resolved there are additional opportunities for improvement that were identified by this finding:

• This issue was missed by Hart's internal testing and quality processes. One way to describe the problem is that different components in the system used different specifications for the upper limit of a shared variable. In this case the write-in field was limited to 100 characters in the central count software but 50 characters in the tabulation software. Further, in the system specifications, Table 2, the limit is set at 25 characters. Thus at least 3 different limits are used for the same variable. If this condition exists for other variables, including those listed in the system limits table,

Table 2, there is the potential for additional undiscovered conflicts. The fact that this possibility exists is an opportunity for improvement for Hart's quality system.

**RECOMMENDED ACTION:** An analysis resulting in changes to the internal testing and product verification quality processes should be undertaken.

• This issue was missed by the VSTL, SLI Global Solutions in its testing and as a result of that failure the problem was not identified during the EAC's certification. In addition several other states also missed the problem.

**RECOMMENDED ACTION:** Both the company and EAC should request that SLI Global

of that investigation and any resulting corrective actions.

• The warning message given "vDrive format is invalid" was neither accurate nor unique to this problem. Further the system documentation did not give a description of why this error would be issued or what should be done about it.

**RECOMMENDED ACTION:** A review of the accuracy of warning messages and the

see if other guidance for other warning and error conditions needs improvement.

• When examined the logs were functionally unusable. This issue will be discussed in more detail in a section dedicated to it.

#### System Log Function

A failing common to all of the current generation of voting systems is that the logging function is provided to pass various requirements for logs but is not functionally a usable or helpful facility. This shortcoming is not unique to the Verity system but this system shares this common failing. Log files are generally inaccessible. With this system they are only available in printed form and not available electronically, without extraordinary measures. The messages are poorly documented or not documented at all. The same message can be used for multiple events, often with very different levels of potential impact. There is no commonality of messaging or event description across system components.

Jurisdictions need the option to routinely consult system logs as part of the canvas. These logs are intended to be an important and independent record of the election. A review of them for system warnings, errors or other records of election issues is an important part of confirming the validity of election results. However, doing so requires that:

• the logs be obtainable in electronic files using commonly available file formats with human readable information.

**RECOMMENDED ACTION:** The system logs should be easily available in electronic files

using commonly used file formats with human readable messages.

• that the messages in the logs be clearly understood and consistently used across system components, so that the same event uses the same log message in all system components.

# **RECOMMENDED ACTION:** Log messages should be consistently used across the system and unique to each event.

- that the messages be unique to an event and one message not be used for different events or multiple messages be used for the same event in different system components.
- that the meaning of each message be clearly described along with the appropriate corrective action for each warning or error be available in the user documentation.

**RECOMMENDED ACTION:** A usability review of the logging system, including the clarity of its documentation, should be performed with corrective actions taken to make the system a routinely usable for election verification and confirm the functionality of detection and correction guidance of warning and error conditions in any unit of the system.

As an example of the general failure to design the logging to be a useful function is the fact that the vDrive error reported previously resulted in 161 pages of indecipherable logging. Appendix C provides the first 22 of the 161 pages that were produced by the vDrive error. As this log clearly demonstrates the system logging is not functionally usable and certainly presents a prohibitive barrier to its routine use as a tool in election management.

#### **Use of China Export Mark**

The CE "Conformité Européenne" Mark is a mandatory conformity marking for products sold within the European Economic Area (EEA). The CE marking is also found on products sold outside the EEA that are manufactured in, or designed to be sold in, the EEA. The mark is a companies declaration that its product meets applicable standards and requirements established by the various directives of the program.

In recent years some Chinese companies have created a slight variant of the CE Mark, called the Chinese Export Mark but commonly called the *Chinese Counterfeit Mark*, Figure 3, because its purpose appears to primarily be to falsely represent that a product meets the requirements of the CE Mark.



Figure 3 - Comparison of the CE and Chinese Counterfeit mark<sup>3</sup>

An instance was found in a system component using the Chinese Counterfeit Mark, Figure 4. This observation initiated a more careful examination of the compliance of that component with all applicable requirements, particularly safety requirements. Compliance with the relevant safety requirements was confirmed through the database of approved products of the Underwriters Laboratory. In this specific case specifications relevant to this exam were misrepresented.



Figure 4 - Use of "China Export" mark on P/N 1005380

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> "Comparison of two used CE marks" by Mattved - Own work. Licensed under CC0 via Commons https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Comparison\_of\_two\_used\_CE\_marks.svg#/media/File:Comparison\_of\_two\_used\_CE\_marks.svg

It is a common business strategy for vendors to seek larger assignments from their customers. Chinese manufacturers commonly offer to provide parts and system components at reduced cost to win further business. The challenge to a company is that unless its supply chain management is extremely diligent corners can be cut and specifications violated. Degraded quality can be a creeping problem that gets worse over time. The observance of the China Export mark heightens concerns of the adequacy of the supply chain management system.

**RECOMMENDED ACTION:** A review of the accuracy of all representations by vendors in the supply chain should be undertaken with an emphasis on discouraging intentionally misleading practices.

## **Compliance Checklist**

The following checklist includes all Texas voting system requirements. The complete checklist is provided as detailed support for the conclusion and recommendation of this report.

Ve	endor: Hart Intercivic Voting System	: Verity	/ 1.0
	Dra Tast Daquiramanta		
	r re- i est Requirements		
•	Is Form 100 complete and satisfactory?	Yes	No
•	Review Form 100 - Schedule A - Have recommendations/issues made from previous exams been corrected or addressed? • N/A	Yes	No ⊠
•	Review Form 101 - Are responses satisfactory?	Yes	No
•	Review change logs and provide information for testing or questioning vendor	Yes	No
•	Training manuals appear complete?	Yes	No
•	<ul> <li>Training manuals appear to be easy to use?</li> <li>A particular deficiency was identified related to instructions on how to obtain the various logs and the meaning of the messages in the logs.</li> <li>Warning messages were insufficiently document to allow them to be understood and corrective action taken based solely on the documentation.</li> </ul>	Yes	No X
•	<ul> <li>Check with other jurisdictions where system is in use and ask questions regarding system, support and training.</li> <li>Staff called Oregon and Washington. Certification reports from MN &amp; VA were also obtained.</li> </ul>	Yes	No
•	<ul> <li>Did the system receive favorable reviews?</li> <li>No reviews of this system were available for this exam.</li> </ul>	Yes	No
•	Do all configurations listed in application seem feasible? Keep this in mind during the examination to make sure components necessary to ensure the security are included in all configurations and that the configurations will meet the counties needs (scanner used as central and/or precinct, etc)	Yes	No
•	Vendors' proposals shall state a clear, unequivocal commitment that the election management and voter tabulation software user's application password is separate from and in addition to any other operating system password.	Yes	No
•	Vendor's system shall support automated application password expiration at intervals specified by a central system administrator.	Yes	No
•	Vendor shall discuss the steps required by the system administrator to implement and maintain automated password expiration. This discussion will include narrative concerning the degree to which the application password expiration capabilities are based on (a) the server or client's operating system, (b) the software application, or (c) both	Yes	No
•	The vendor's proposal shall state the name of any automated incident, issue, or problem tracking system used by the firm in providing support to its election system clients.	Yes	No
	Verify Installation		
•	Verify/List all hardware	Yes	No

•	Verify/List all COTS hardware/software versions	Yes	No
	•	$\boxtimes$	
•	Is the COTS hardware being demonstrated the same version as what was tested at the VSTL?	Yes	No
		$\boxtimes$	
•	Is the COTS software being demonstrated the same version as what was tested at the VSTL?	Yes	No
	-	$\boxtimes$	
•	Witness or actual install the software and firmware with the SOS CDs received from VSTL.	Yes	No
		$\boxtimes$	

Vendor: Hart Intercivic

Voting System: Verity 1.0

Texas	Federal			
Law	Law			
		System Review		
		System Keview		
TEC 122.001		• Preserves the secrecy of the ballot	Yes	No
TEC 122.001		• Is suitable for the purpose for which it is intended	Yes	No
TEC 122.001		• Operates safely, efficiently, and accurately and complies with the error rate standards of the voting system standards adopted by the EAC	Yes	No
TEC 122.001		• Is safe from fraudulent or unauthorized manipulation (physical exam and review of manuals)	Yes	No 🖂
TEC 122.001		• Permits voting on all offices and measures to be voted on at the election	Yes	No
TEC 122.001	HAVA	• Warns of Overvote - Prevents counting votes on offices and measures on which the voter is not entitled to vote	Yes	No
	HAVA	Warns of Undervote	Yes	No
TEC 122.001		• Prevents counting votes by the same voter for more than one candidate for the same office or, in elections in which a voter is entitled to vote for more than one candidate for the same office, prevents counting votes for more than the number of candidates for which the voter is entitled to vote	Yes ⊠	No
TEC 122.001		• Prevents counting a vote on the same office or measure more than once	Yes	No
TEC 122.001		Permits write-in voting	Yes	No
TEC 122.001		• Is capable of permitting straight-party voting	Yes	No
TEC 65.007		• Is capable of cross-over votes	Yes	No
TEC 122.001	HAVA	• Is capable of providing records from which the operation of the voting system may be audited	Yes	No 🖂
		• Is it easy to choose the appropriate ballot style?	Yes	No
		• Is the number of ballot styles available on a unit limited?	Yes	No
		• Can you cancel the marking of a ballot after starting? Explain how.	Yes	No
		• Is there a way to properly secure all ports on the system?	Yes	No
		• Are instructions provided in the documentation for securing the system?	Yes	No
		• Usable for curbside voting?	Yes	No
		How to setup or modify audio files	Yes	No
		How to adjust volume	Yes	No

	• Does the system have any RF (Radio Frequency) communications?	Yes	No X
	<ul> <li>Have representatives of the visually impaired community evaluated the accessibility of the system?</li> </ul>	Yes	No
	• Test both early voting and election day - all functions opening/closing	Yes	No
	• Does system include sip 'n puff for accessibility	Yes	No
	Does system include paddles for accessibility	Yes	No
	<b>Texas Real-time Audit Log Review</b>		
TEC 81.62	• A central tabulating device must include a continuous feed printer dedicated to a real-time audit log, which prints out all significant election events and their date and time stamps.		
	See VVSG 2005:	Yes	No
	2.2.5.2.1.d: "The audit record shall be active whenever the system is in an operating mode. This record shall be available at all times, though it need not be continually visible."	$\boxtimes$	
	2.2.5.2.1.g: "The system shall be capable of printing a copy of the audit record."		
TEC 81.62	• Log error messages and operator response to those messages	Yes	No
TEC	• Log the number of ballets read for a given president		
81.62	• Log the number of bandis read for a given precinct	Yes	No
TEC	Log completion of reading ballots for a given precinct		
81.62	See VVSG 2005 Section 4.4.3 b.3	Yes	No
TEC	<ul> <li>Log the identity of the input ports used for modem transfers from</li> </ul>		
81.62	precincts	Yes	No
	See VVSG 2005 Section 4.4.2.g.1-4		
TEC 81.62	Log users logging in and out from election system	Yes	No
TEC	See VVSG 2005 4.4.3.a.4, 4.4.3.d, 6.5.5.a & c		
81.62	Log precincts being zeroed	Yes	No
TEC	See VVSG 2003 4.4.3.0.2		
81.62	Log reports being generated  See VVSG 2005 4.4.3 d	Yes	No
TEC	• Log diagnostics of any type being run		
81.62	See VVSG 2005 4.4.2.a & d	Yes	No
	• Print any attempt to tally or load votes that have already been tallied or	Vaa	Ma
	counted, identifying the precinct or source of the votes and flagging it as a duplicate	$\leq$	
	• Print starting the tally software (e.g. from the operating system) or exiting	Yes	No

		the tally software, or any access to the operating system.	$\boxtimes$	
		• Record if a printer is paused, turned off, turned on, disconnected, and when reconnected.	Yes	No
		<b>Optical Scan System Review</b>		
TEC 122.001		• Preserves the secrecy of the ballot	Yes	No
TEC 122.001		• Is suitable for the purpose for which it is intended	Yes	No
TEC 122.001	•	• Operates safely, efficiently, and accurately and complies with the error rate standards of the voting system standards adopted by the EAC	Yes	No
TEC 122.001		<ul> <li>Is safe from fraudulent or unauthorized manipulation (physical exam and review of manuals)</li> </ul>	Yes	No
TEC 122.001	•	<ul> <li>Permits voting on all offices and measures to be voted on at the election</li> </ul>	Yes	No
TEC 122.001	HAVA	<ul> <li>Warns of Overvote - Prevents counting votes on offices and measures on which the voter is not entitled to vote</li> </ul>	Yes	No
	HAVA	• Warns of Undervote	Yes	No
TEC 122.001	· · · · ·	<ul> <li>Prevents counting votes by the same voter for more than one candidate for the same office or, in elections in which a voter is entitled to vote for more than one candidate for the same office, prevents counting votes for more than the number of candidates for which the voter is entitled to vote</li> </ul>	Yes ⊠	No
TEC 122.001	•	• Prevents counting a vote on the same office or measure more than once	Yes	No
TEC 122.001	•	Permits write-in voting	Yes	No
TEC 122.001	•	• Is capable of permitting straight-party voting	Yes	No
TEC 65.007	•	• Is capable of cross-over votes	Yes	No
TEC 122.001	HAVA	• Is capable of providing records from which the operation of the voting system may be audited	Yes	No
	•	• Reports available by precinct?	Yes	No
		• In order to perform a manual recount, can you print cast vote records for a precinct (including early voting, ED and absentee?) from an individual DRE?	Yes	No
TEC 127.154		• Does each unit have a permanent identification number?	Yes	No
		• Is there a way to properly secure all ports on the system?	Yes	No
		• Are instructions provided in the documentation for securing the system?	Yes	No

# **Appendix A - EAC Certificate of Certification**

	United States Election Assi Certificate of Cor	stance Commission	VVSG 2005 VER. 1
STATES OF AMERICA	Hart Verit	y 1.0	CERTIFIED
The voting system identi- laboratory for conforman- evaluated for this certific applies only to the specifi- has been verified by the L <i>tification Program Manu-</i> the evidence adduced. T ernment and no warranty	fied on this certificate has been ence to the 2005 <i>Voluntary Voting</i> ation are detailed in the attached fic version and release of the prove EAC in accordance with the proveral and the conclusions of the test his certificate is not an endorsem of the product is either expressed	evaluated at an accredited version of the second se	oting system testing VSG). Components ument. This certificate uration. The evaluation <i>system Testing and Cer</i> - eport are consistent with agency of the U.S. Gov-
Product Name: <u>Verity</u>		n.n.n	
Model or Version: <u>1.0</u> Name of VSTL: <u>SLI Glo</u>	obal Solutions	yes.n	
EAC Certification Number:	HRT-Verity-1.0	Chief Operating Officer & Acti U.S. Election Assistance	ng Executive Director e Commission
Date Issued: 05/12/2015		Scope of Certification	n Attached

## **Appendix B - Digital Signatures of Software Examined**

There were 1,641 files on the installation media provide by SLI for this exam. SHA-256 digital signatures of those files were recorded to confirm continuity of the software certified in this exam with that tested by SLI and certified by the EAC. These signatures can be used to verify that the software used in the future is identical to that examined during this exam.

## **Appendix C - Verity System Log Report**

The following is the log report of the vDrive failure. Note both the length and lack of clarity of the events recorded. Only the first 22 of the 161 pages of this log are reproduced below to provide an example of the system log.

	System Log Report	1						Page 1 of 161	Sy	stem Log Report							Page 2 of 161
	Run Time 4.20 PM Run Date 9/24/2019								R								
		1.11.1															
1	2015-09-23 11:00:48	W1494024503	Verity	none	0	System, Startup,	Starting up	The system is starting up	23	2015-09-23 14:03:03	D1500097607	Verity	none	0	Authorizati on, Info Startun	User Authorization	User 'user' log in is successful
2	2015-09-23.11/01/15	W1494074503	Verity	100e	0	Authorizati	Access to OS	Access granted	24	2015-09-23 14:03:05	D1500097607	Election Manager 1.0.3	user		into		
-		112-12-102-12-22	Party.			on, System, ElectionSe			25	2015-09-23 14:03:05	D1500097607	Election Manager 1.0.3	user	0	UI, Info	View loaded	View name: Elections list
						curity, Info			26	2015-09-23 14:04:10	D1500097607	Election Manager	user	0	UI, into	Menu tam Selected	Import Signed
3	2015-09-23 11:01:16	W1494024503	Verity	none	0	System, Info	Shutdown	down	27	2015-09-23 14:04:34	D1500097607	Election Manager	USEL	0	Authorizati	Verity Key requested	
4	2015-09-23 11:06:08	D1500097607	Verity	none	0	System, Startup,	Starting up	The system is starting up				1.0.3			on, Hardware, Info		
5	2015-09-23 11:11:01	D1500097607	Verity	none	0	Authorizati on, Info	User Authorization	User 'user' log in is successful	28	2015-09-23 14:04:38	D1500097607	Election Manager 1.0.3	u ser	0	ElectionSe curity, Info	Verity Key read	Key for this election
6	2015-09-23 11:11:01	D1500097607	Verity	none	0	Authentica tion, System,	User list action	user password was updated	29	2015-09-23 14:04:38	D1500097607	Election Manager 1.0.3	user	0	Authorizati on, Hardware,	Venty Key requested	
						ElectionSe curity, Info					D10000000000	Resting Manager	117.007	0	Authorizati	Pasaword provided for	Password correct:
Ţ	2015-09-23 11:11:01	D1500097607	Verity	none	0	UI, Info	View loaded	View name: "Your password has been successfully changed."	30	2015-09-23 14:04:47	D120003/60/	1.0.3	050		on, Hardware, Info	Verity Kay	True
								message box	31	2015-09-23 14:04:48	D1500097907	Election Manager	user	a	DataEvcha	Signed election import	The election 'FINAL Texas
4	2015-09-23 11:11:03	D1500097607	Verity	none	0	UI, Info	Button pressed	Button name: OK				1.0.3			nge, mo		General' (55674) was
9	2015-09-23 11:11:05	D1500097607	VerityUserManag er 1.0.3	user	0	Startup, Info	Application opened										'E:\Texas\TX Certification
10	2015-09-23 11:11:07	D1500097607	VerityUserManag er 1.0:3	user	0	UII, Info	View loaded	View name: User Management									xport_Signed_FINAL Texas
11	2015-09-23 11:11:27	D1500097607	VerityUserManag er 1.0.3	USEF	0	System, Info	Application crosed										General_55674_20150 917-1922.ztp/
12	2015-09-23 11:31:48	D1500097607	Verity	none	0	UII, Into	View loaded	View name: 'The user has been logged out.'	32	2015-09-23 14:04:48	D1500097607	Election Manager 1.0.3	user	0	UI, info	View loaded	View name: 'The import was successful message box
13	2015-09-23 11:31:48	D1500097607	Verity	none	0	Authorizati on, Info	User Authorization	User 'user' has been logged out forcibly.	33	2015-09-23 14:04:50	D1500097607	Election Manager	user	0	UI, Into	Button pressed	Button name: OK
1.4	2015 00.2231.40.02	01500007607	Marity	0000	D	UI. Info	Button pressed	Reason: 'Inactivity' Button name: OK	34	2015-09-23 14:04:52	D1500097607	Election Manager	user	0	System,	Application closed	
14	2015-09-23 11:40:07	0150009/60/	wenty	none	0	Authorizati	Dear Authorization	User \user' log in is			0.1000000000	1.0.3 Varite Cantrol	11505	0	Startup,	Application opened	
15	2015-09-23 11:40:10	D1500097607	Verity VerityCentral	user	0	on, Info Startup,	Application opened	successful	35	2015-09-23 140453	01500097607	1.0.3 VeriteCentral	USAT .	0	tinfo UI, Info	View loaded	View name: Select
17	2015-09-23 11:40:16	D1500097607	1.0.3 VerityCentral	u ser	0	UL Info	View loaded	View name: Select	30	2015-09-23 14:04:53	D1500097607	1.0.3 VerityCentral	user	0	UI, Info	Viewloaded	Election chevron View name: Select
**	1017 17 10 11 11 11		1,0.3					Election chevron	37	2012-09-23 14/04:33	D130003/40/	1.0.3				51 Fra 0	Election task
18	2015-09-23 11:40:16	D1500097607	VerityCentral 1.0.3	U SOF	0	UL Info	View loaded	View name: Select Election task	38	2015-09-23 14:04:55	D1500097607	VerityCentral 1.0.3	user	0	ElectionM anagement t, Info	Election Open	Texas General (55674) was
19	2015-09-23 12:00:38	D1500097607	VerityCentral 1.0.3	user	0	oyasem, Into	Арресалол совец							0	ElectionM	Election Open	opened. The election 'FINAL
20	2015-09-23 12:00:38	D1500097607	Verity	none	0	UI, Info	View loaded	View name: 'The user has been logged out.' message box	39	2015-09-23 14:07:11	D1500097607	1.0.3	0.964		anagemen t, Info		Texas General' (55674) was opened.
21	2015-09-23 12:00:38	D1500097607	Verity	none	0	Authorizati on, Info	User Authorization	User 'user' has been logged out forcibly.	40	2015-09-23 14:07:18	D1500097607	VerityCentral 1.0.3	user	0	System, Info	Application closed	
22	2015-09-23 12:02:07	D1500097607	Verity	none	0	UI, Info	Button pressed	Button name: OK	41	2015-09-23 14:07:18	D1500097607	Election Manager	r user	0	Startup. Info	Application opened	

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Los Dive S		Device 10															
2015-09-23 14	07.19	01500097607	Election Manager	user	0	UI, Info	View loaded	View name: Elections	63	2015-09-24 14:16:24	D1500097607	Verity	none	0	UI. Info	Button pressed	Button name: OK
			1.0.3		0	LIL Info	Manu New Selected	list Nenu Item Name:	64	2015-09-24 14:16:32	D1500097607	Verity	none	0	Authorizati on, Info	User Authorization	User 'user' log in is successful
2015-09-23 14	07:22	D1500097607	Election Manager 1.0.3	user		54, IND	Wend hern Serected	Delete	65	2015-09-24 14:16:34	D1500097607	Election Manager	user	0	Startup,	Application opened	
2015-09-23 14	07.22	D1500097607	Election Manager 1.0.3	user	0	UI, Info	View loaded	View name: "The selected election will be deleted. Do you	66	2015-09-24 14:16:34	D1500097607	1.0.3 Election Manager 1.0.3	user	0	UI, Info	View loaded	View name: Elections list
								message box	67	2015-09-24 14:16:49	D1500097607	Election Manager	user	0	UI, Info	Menu Item Selected	Menu Hern Name: Import Staned
2015-09-23 14	07:23	D1500097607	Election Manager 1.0.3	user	0	UII, Info	Button pressed	Button name: Yes	68	2015-09-24 14:16:53	D1500097607	Election Manager	user	0	UI, Info	Menu Item Selected	Menu Hem Name:
2015-09-23 14	107:24	D1500097607	Election Manager	user	0	ElectionDe ta, Info	Election deleted	The election 'FINAL Texas General' was	69	2015-09-24 14:17:17	D1500097607	1.0.3 Election Manager	user	0	Authorizati	Verity Key requested	Import Signed
2015-09-23 14	27.25	D1500097607	Election Manager	user	0	System, Info	Application closed	deleted				1.0.3			info		
2015-09-23 14	27.25	D1500097607	Verity	none	0	UI, Info	View loaded	View name: 'The user has been logged out.'	70	2015-09-24 14:17:21	D1500097607	Election Manager 1.0.3	user.	0	ElectionSe curity, Info	Verity Key read	Key for this election
2015-09-23 14	27:25	D1500097607	Verity	none	ū	Authorizati on, Info	User Authorization	message box User 'user' has been logged out forcibly. Reason: 'Inactivity'	71	2015-09-24 14:17:21	D1500097607	Election Manager 1.0.3	LISET	0	Authorizati on, Hardware, Info	Verity Key requested	
2015-09-23 15	52:23	D1500097607	Verity	none	0	UL Info	Button pressed	Button name: OK	72	2015-09-24 14:17:31	D1500097607	Election Manager	LISH?	D	Authorizati on.	Password provided for Verity Key	Password correct: True
2015-09-23 15	52:34	D1500097607	Verity	none	σ	Authorizati on, Info	User Authorization	User 'user' log in is successful				103			Hardware, Info		
2015-09-23 15	52:36	D1500097607	VerityDesktop 1.0.3	user	٥	Startup, Info	Application opened		73	2015-09-24 14:17:32	D1500097607	Election Manager 1.0.3	user	0	DataExcha rige, Info	Signed election import	The election 'FINAL Texas General' (55574) was
2015-09-2315	52:39	D1500097607	VerityDesktop 1.0.3	user	0	System, Info	Application closed										Imported from 'E:(Texas/TX
2015-09-2315	:52:59	D1500097607	VerityDesktop 1.0.3	user	0	Startup, Info	Application opened										Election/BuildCount_E xport_Signed_FINAL
2015-09-23-15	854:30	D1500097607	VerityDesktop 1.0.3	user	0	System, ElectionSe curity, Info	Validation	Status: Started validation,									Texas General 59674_20160 917-1922 zio'
2015-09-23 15	254:32	01500097607	VerityDesktop 1.0.3	user	0	System, ElectionSe curity, Info	Validation	Status: Completed validation successfully.	74	2015-09-24 14:17:32	D1500097607	Election Manager 1.0.3	user	0	UI, Info	View loaded	View name: 'The import was successful' message box
2015-09-23 15	254.32	D1500097607	VerityDesktop 1.0.3	user	0	System, DataExcha nge, Isto	Export hashes	Hashes exported to 'F:Washes.csv'	75	2015-09-24 14:17:35	D1500097607	Election Manager 1.0.3	user	0	UI, Info	Button pressed	Button name: OK
2015-09-23 15	\$ 54 32	D1500097607	VerityDesktop 1.0.3	use.	0	UI, Info	View loaded	View name: "Validation export completed	76	2015-09-24 14:17:37	D1500097607	Election Manager 1.0.3	user	0	System, Info	Application closed	
								successfully. Output the location is F:/Hashes.csv.*	77	2015-09-24 14:17:38	D1500097607	VerityCentral 1.0.3	user	0	Startup, Info	Application opened	
2015-00-2210	\$54.97	D1500097607	VerityDeskton	USAT	0	UI, Info	Button pressed	message box Button name: OK	78	2015-09-24 14:17:38	D1500097607	VerityCentral 1.0.3	user	0	UII, Info	View loaded	View name: Select Election chewion
-015-05-13 13	anar		1.0.3		0	System	Application closed		79	2015-09-24 14:17:38	D1500097607	VerityCentral 1.0.3	LISHT	0	UI, Info	View loaded	View name: Select Election task
2015-09-23 16	6:15:01	D1500097607	1.0.3 Verity	none	0	UI, Info	View loaded	View name: The user	80	2015-09-24 14:18:09	D1500097607	VerityCentral 1.0.3	LISH?	0	ElectionM anagement	Election Open	The election 'FINAL Texas
								has been logged out."							1, 1110		opened.
2015-09-23 14	6:15:01	D1500097607	Verity	none	0	Authorizati on, Info	User Authorization	User 'user' has been logged out forcibly. Reason: 'Insclivity'	81	2015-09-24 14:28:39	D1500097607	VerityCentral 1.0.3	Liser.	0	system, Exception, Fatal	Exception occurred	Exception details: System, Reflection. Tar- getInvocationExceptio n: Exception has been

System Log Report Run Time 4 20 PM Run Date 9/24/2015	Page 5 of 161	System Log Report Run Time 4-20 PM Run Date 5/24/2015	Page 6 of 161.
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