Risk-Limiting Audit Handbook

Texas Secretary *of* State
Elections Division

800-252-VOTE • 512-463-5650
sos.texas.gov • votetexas.gov

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INTRODUCTION

To ensure the integrity of election results, Section 127.302 of the Texas Election Code mandates a Risk-Limiting Audit (RLA), a type of post-election tabulation audit designed to verify the accuracy of election outcomes. The Elections Division of the Office of the Texas Secretary of State has prepared this comprehensive guide to support election officials with step-by-step instructions, best practices, and essential resources for conducting efficient, transparent audits.

References are made to the appropriate sections in the Texas Election Code, unless otherwise indicated.

The Elections Division of the Office of the Texas Secretary of State is open during the hours that the polls are open for voting on all uniform election dates. Answers to questions on election law and procedures may be obtained by calling the Elections Division toll-free at 800-252-VOTE or 512-463-5650.

Visit sos.texas.gov, as well as votetexas.gov, for additional election information.


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
Chapter 1

RISK-LIMITING AUDIT OVERVIEW

One of an election official's most important responsibilities is to report correct election **outcomes**. To ensure this, several methods have been developed to verify the accuracy of results, including **Risk-Limiting Audits**. In a risk-limiting audit, or RLA, a small sample of random ballots from an election is hand-counted. The results of this hand count must provide strong evidence that the reported outcome is correct by meeting a pre-determined confidence level, called the **risk limit**. If the risk limit is not met, more ballots are added to the sample and hand-counted. If after multiple rounds the risk limit is still not met, the audit progresses to a full hand recount.



There are several types of RLA; this guide describes procedures and concepts for the **Ballot Polling** method. Election officials conducting a ballot polling RLA create an inventory of voted ballots called a **ballot manifest**, retrieve a set of randomly determined ballots, and then hand-count those ballots.



ROLES

In Texas, an RLA must be conducted for every election for a statewide contest or measure. To audit a statewide race, the RLA must be conducted across entire state. This process is coordinated by the Secretary of State's Office and conducted by county election officials. The contest to be audited and the risk limit are chosen by the Secretary of State's Office, which also compiles election results, chooses the sample size, and determines which random ballots will be audited. Ballots to be audited are retrieved and hand counted by county election officials. After all ballots in the RLA have been retrieved and counted, the State calculates the risk and issues a report on the results of the audit.

Audit Administrator

- State coordinator of the audit
- Sets parameters of the audit and monitors the overall progress of the audit

Jurisdiction Manager

- County level coordinator of the audit
- Uploads and downloads files and monitors progress of the Audit Boards

Audit Boards

- Consists of teams of two people
- Retrieve specific ballots and enter voter selections into the audit software

Poll Watchers

- Appointed by a candidate or political party to observe the audit process and ensure transparency and fairness

NUMBER OF BALLOTS TO SAMPLE

The number of ballots to sample depends on the risk limit and the margin of victory in the audited contest. The table below shows an estimate of how many ballots might be required for an RLA with different risk limits.

Ballot Polling (5% Risk Limit)	Ballot Polling (10% Risk Limit)
1,350	1,181
Total Votes Cast: 8,102,908 (2022 Texas Gubernatorial Election)	

HOW AUDITED BALLOTS ARE DETERMINED

Each ballot in the state must have an equal chance of being selected. To achieve this, State officials combine ballot manifests from every county in the state to create a master index of every ballot voted in the election. Which of these ballots to audit is determined by a **pseudo-random number generator**, a set of mathematical formulas that is initialized by a **seed number** and produces a set of numbers that have random properties.

At the beginning of the RLA, a pseudo-random number generator produces numbers between 1 and the total number of ballot sheets in the election. The resulting numbers are then mapped to the ballot manifest to determine which county and which container holds the ballot to be audited. The same seed number will always produce the same set of pseudo-random numbers, which allows observers to verify that the correct ballots are audited. To generate the seed number, state officials hold a public ceremony where 10-sided di are rolled a total of at least 20 times.

RLA SOFTWARE

To coordinate the sample size of the RLA, generate a list of randomly selected ballots, record voter selections and calculate statistical analysis, state and county officials use specialized software called Arlo. Access to Arlo is provided by the state on an audit by audit basis. Arlo is open-source, which allows observers to check each step of the process, including the statistical functions used to calculate the results of the audit, to make sure the audit is being conducted in a meaningful way.



Chapter 2

BEFORE THE AUDIT

AUDIT PREPARATION

Organization

County election offices should prepare for conducting the audit by ensuring they have organized ballot storage and management practices, consistent labeling conventions for ballot containers, and strong chain of custody procedures. Ballot containers should be clearly labeled and stored in a way that allows easy identification and access when ballots are retrieved. Possible sorting options for containers include alphabetical, numerical, or other methods such as random stow, where containers are associated with a pallet or cart and assigned a location in the warehouse. Chain of custody paperwork for each container should include seal numbers and show that ballots have not been removed or altered.

Creating a Ballot Manifest


Before the RLA begins, each county must create an inventory of ballots voted in the election, called a **Ballot Manifest**. The Ballot Manifest describes how ballots are stored and consists of two columns, one with the name of every ballot container and one column with that container's number of ballot sheets. An accurate Ballot Manifest that matches how containers are labeled and how ballots are stored is key to a successful RLA.

	A	B
1	Batch Name	Number of Ballots
2	By Mail #1	550
3	By Mail #2	250
4	Provisionals	75
5	EV Location A #1	600
6	EV Location A #2	550
7	EV Location A #3	250
8	EV Location B #1	575
9	EV Location B #2	250
10	ED Location A #1	600
11	ED Location A #2	300
12	ED Location B	400
13	ED Location C	500
14	ED Location D #1	575
15	ED Location D #2	100

Because the RLA verifies the results of the voting system, the information in the ballot manifest must be generated or validated by a source from outside of the voting system. Generally, this will be the number of voters checked in at a location. Common sources for the number of voters checked in include ePollbook reports, poll lists, or ballot accounting paperwork. The number of check-ins may be reconciled with the total number of ballots cast from the voting system, whether the Pub count, scanner report tapes, or central count reports. If after reconciliation the numbers do not match, choose the larger of the two.

The batch name should match how the ballot containers are physically labeled. For in-person ballots, this will often be the voting location's name or ID number. For centrally scanned ballots where several batches are in the same container, the ballot manifest may list sub-batches, for instance "Ballot by Mail Container 1, Batch 3." To prepare the Ballot Manifest, follow these steps:

STEP 1	Create a spreadsheet with two columns. The first column titled **Batch Name** is for container/batch name and the second column titled **Number of Ballots** indicates the number of ballot sheets in each container.
STEP 2	Enter the data for all ballots cast in the election. When finished, ensure the total number of ballots matches the number of ballots cast.
STEP 3	Then, click **File** and **Save As**. Select the location where you want to save the spreadsheet. Enter the file name **[COUNTY NAME] Ballot Manifest**, choose **CSV** in the **Save as type** box, and click **Save**.




A ballot manifest template may be downloaded by visiting arlo.voting.works and logging in as a Jurisdiction Manager.

Five common reasons a Ballot Manifest may be rejected by Arlo include:




Column names not matching the template



Batch names repeating (each batch must have a unique name)



Empty rows in the middle of the spreadsheet



Manifest including a totals row



File not saved as a .CSV

Staffing

How many Audit Boards to schedule depends on the number of ballots to be retrieved and how many containers must be opened. With the ballot polling method, each Audit Board can retrieve approximately 5 to 25 ballots per hour. The Office of the Texas Secretary of State will provide estimates for the number of ballots to be retrieved.

Room Setup

A secure, accessible facility with adequate space is essential for conducting an RLA. This location must have a reliable internet connection to facilitate the downloading and printing of materials such as the ballot retrieval list, placeholder sheets, Audit Board credentials, and ballot labels. At minimum, the room will need a table for each of the following:

- Ballot container check-in/out station;
- Each Audit Board for ballot retrieval (2 chairs);
- Ballot inspection station (2 chairs); and
- Poll watcher station (minimum 1 chair).

Supplies Checklist

The jurisdiction manager should collect the following supplies and place in the room where the RLA will take place. Our office recommends items marked with an asterisk be placed on the tables designated for each Audit Board.



- [ ] Tables and chairs
- [ ] Computer with internet access
- [ ] Colored paper (8 ½" x 11")
- [ ] Removable labels (1" x 2 ⅝" or Avery 6479)
- [ ] Scissors
- [ ] Rubber finger tips or fingertip moistener (i.e., Sortkwik)*
- [ ] Rubber bands or binder clips*
- [ ] Sticky notes (i.e., Post-it)*
- [ ] Baskets or boxes for holding audited ballots*
- [ ] Ballot containers (organized by BBM, EV, ED, and other)
- [ ] Chain of custody documents
- [ ] Seals for the ballot containers
- [ ] Keys for the ballot containers






Chapter 3




CONDUCTING THE AUDIT

UPLOAD BALLOT MANIFEST

Jurisdiction Manager	
STEP 1	Designate between two and four Jurisdiction Managers and provide their names and contact information to the Secretary of State's office when requested.
STEP 2	Create a ballot manifest that lists all of the ballot containers and the number of ballot sheets inside each. A ballot manifest template may be downloaded by visiting arlo.voting.works and logging in as a Jurisdiction Manager. For more information about creating a ballot manifest, see "Creating a Ballot Manifest" above.
STEP 3	After double-checking that all ballots have been accounted for and the ballot manifest is saved as a CSV file, use Google Chrome or Safari as your browser and visit arlo.voting.works. Enter the email address provided to the Audit Administrator and select **Log in to your audit**. 
STEP 4	The Jurisdiction Manager will receive an email with a verification code. Enter the verification code into the audit software when prompted. Then, click on the button with your county name. 

STEP 5	In the audit software, click **Browse** and navigate to the file location of the CSV ballot manifest that was created. Once selected, click **Upload File**. The audit software will give you a message telling you whether your upload was successful or not. If you have problems uploading the file, verify you have saved the spreadsheet in CSV format, your columns are named correctly, and that there are no extra columns or rows. If you continue to have problems with the manifest, email electionsecurity@sos.texas.gov with the subject line **[County Name] RLA Ballot Manifest**. 
STEP 6	When the upload is successful, a message will appear at the top of the screen that says "Ballot manifest uploaded" or "1/1 files successfully uploaded." 
STEP 7	After you upload, if a mistake is found in the file, log back in to the audit software and use the **Replace File** button to update the file. To delete the file, click **Delete File**. 


RETRIEVE BALLOTS

Jurisdiction Manager Set the number of Audit Boards, download and print audit materials, and distribute to Audit Boards.	
STEP 1	Use Google Chrome or Safari as your browser and visit arlo.voting.works when prompted. Enter the email address provided to the Audit Administrator and select **Log in to your audit**. 
STEP 2	Select the number of Audit Boards to complete the work and press **Save & Next**. • When large amounts of ballots are being audited, more teams should be utilized. In general, one Audit Board can pull 5-25 ballots per hour. 
STEP 3	Download and print the following files (*see* Appendix A for examples): • **Ballot Retrieval List**—List of all the ballots that need to be retrieved in the county. • **Placeholder Sheets**—Ready to print placeholder sheets for use in ballot retrieval on colored paper. • **Ballot Labels**—Ready to print ballot labels for use in ballot retrieval on removable labels (Avery 6479 or other comparable option). 

STEP 3	• **Audit Board Credentials**—A QR code and URL for use by Audit Boards when performing Ballot Inspection.
STEP 4	Distribute the placeholder sheets, ballot labels, and credentials to each Audit Board.



Audit Board



Use the placeholder sheets to locate ballot containers, pull specific random ballots, label the retrieved ballots, insert placeholders, and complete all necessary chain of custody procedures.




STEP 1	Find the ballot container ("Batch") indicated on the placeholder sheet.
STEP 2	Break the seal on the ballot container and document chain of custody.
STEP 3	Open the ballot container, remove the batch of ballots, and arrange into a neat stack. Ballots do not have to remain in the same order as inside the container. 
STEP 4	Place a sticky note on top of the stack to mark the first ballot.
STEP 5	Start counting at one and stop counting when you get to the ballot ("Ballot Number") indicated on the placeholder sheet. • You may also refer to the ballot number column of the ballot retrieval list. Audit Board #1 Batch: EV Library Ballot Number: 538
STEP 6	After counting to the ballot number, pull the ballot out of the stack and set aside.

STEP 7	Replace the pulled ballot with the corresponding placeholder sheet.
STEP 8	Place the corresponding label on the ballot in an area designated by the jurisdiction manager.
STEP 9	Put the retrieved ballot aside in a separate basket or box until all ballots on the ballot retrieval list have been pulled.
STEP 10	After all ballots have been retrieved from a batch, return the remaining ballots to the container.
STEP 11	Reseal the container (keeping the retrieved ballots with labels applied separate) and document chain of custody.
STEP 12	Repeat steps 1-11 for all placeholder sheets.

HAND COUNT BALLOTS

Audit Boards Review pulled ballots and enter voter selections for each ballot into the Arlo software.	
STEP 1	Log in by typing the web address found at the bottom of the Audit Board Credentials into Google Chrome or Safari. • *Note:* The web address and QR code is unique for each Audit Board. The example below is for reference only. 
STEP 2	Enter names of Audit Board members, select party affiliation, and click "**Next**." • It is recommended that two people complete this task to ensure accurate data entry. 
STEP 3	Click "**Audit First Ballot**" or select a ballot and click "**Audit Ballot**" to begin recording voter selections.

STEP 3	
STEP 4	Verify the displayed batch and ballot number using the placeholder label affixed to the ballot.
STEP 5	Both Audit Board members should review the voter's selection and determine the voter's intent. For questions about resolving voter intent, see the Early Voting Ballot Board Handbook.
STEP 6	Select the corresponding candidate's name and click "**Submit Selections**." 
STEP 7	On the verification screen, review the ballot information for accuracy and select "**Confirm Selections**" to go to the next ballot.

STEP 7	
STEP 8	The audit software will automatically progress to the next ballot. Repeat steps 4-7 for each ballot selected.
STEP 9	After all ballots have been audited, the audit software will automatically return to the dashboard. At the top or bottom of the dashboard, click "**Submit Audited Ballots**." 
STEP 10	Reenter names of Audit Board members exactly as they were entered in step 2 and click "**Sign Off**." If the Audit Board does not sign off, the audit cannot be concluded. 

STEP 11	Click "**Log Out**" in the upper righthand corner of the webpage. 
STEP 12	Return the audited ballots to their original ballot containers and document chain of custody.



Chapter 4


CONCLUDING THE AUDIT

CALCULATE RISK

After all of the audit boards across the state have finished the auditing round, the Audit Administrator will calculate the risk limit and send a mass email informing county election official of the results. If the risk limit is not met, the audit will progress to another round of ballot retrieval. If the risk limit has been met, the audit will conclude.

REPORT RESULTS

After the conclusion of the audit, the Texas Secretary of State's office will publish the results of the RLA.





Appendix A

GLOSSARY

Arlo: An open-source auditing software created by the non-profit organization VotingWorks. The software sets the sample size of the audit, generates a list of randomly selected ballots, and calculates all statistical analysis.

Audit Administrator: State coordinator of the audit that sets the risk-limit, adds jurisdiction mangers, inputs the random seed number, and monitors the overall progress of the RLA. In Texas, the audit administrator is the Secretary of State.

Audit Board Credentials: A QR code and web address used by Audit Boards to log in to Arlo.

Audit Board: Consists of a team of two people that retrieve specific ballots and record voter selections into the audit software.

Ballot Labels: Removable ballot labels that are placed on retrieved ballots for identification (Avery 6479 or other comparable option).

Ballot Manifest: A spreadsheet that describes how all ballots voted in an election are stored and allows ballots to be located for retrieval.

Ballot Polling Audit: A method of risk-limiting audit in which a random sample of ballots is hand counted. The margin of this hand count is compared to election results and determines whether the risk limit has been met.

Ballot Retrieval List: A list of all of the ballots that need to be retrieved in the county.

Batch: Refers to a group of ballots stored within a single ballot container. It serves as the organizational unit that allows an Audit Board to find specific ballots among thousands.

Full Hand Count: Occurs when the margin of victory is so close that the number of ballots to be audited is high and counting all ballots cast in the election would be more efficient, or when the results of multiple rounds detect discrepancies in the results and require a full hand count to confirm the outcome of the election.

Jurisdiction Manager: County-level coordinator of the audit that uploads the ballot manifest, enters the number of Audit Boards, downloads audit files, and monitors progress of the Audit Boards.

Margin of Victory: The numerical or percentage difference between the leading candidate and the runner-up. It is the primary factor used to determine the initial sample size of ballots needed for the RLA. Contests with a thin margin of victory necessitate more ballots to be audited to confirm the outcome of the election.

Outcome: The reported winner(s), not the exact tabulated vote totals. A wrong outcome is when the originally reported outcome disagrees with what a full recount would show.

Placeholder Sheet: Colored sheet used to mark the location of a ballot retrieved in the audit.

Post-election Audit: A process where election officials verify the tabulated outcome of an election by sampling ballots, ideally using predetermined statistical methods.

Pseudo-random number generator: A set of mathematical formulas that is initialized by a seed and produces a set of numbers that have random properties. The same seed will always produce the same pseudo-random numbers, and can be used by observers to verify that the correct ballots are audited.

Risk Limit: The maximum chance that the RLA would correct a wrong outcome. For example, a 5% risk limit means there is a 95% chance that the audit would correct a wrong outcome. If the reported outcome of the election is correct, then the audit offers a strong level of evidence supporting that outcome. The risk limit is set by the Secretary of State's Office.

Risk-Limiting Audit (RLA): A type of post-election tabulation audit that manually inspects randomly sampled, voter-verifiable paper ballots to confirm the outcome of an election at a pre-specified level of confidence, called a risk limit. If the reported outcome of the election is correct, then the RLA offers a strong level of evidence supporting that outcome. There are three types of RLA: ballot polling, ballot comparison, and batch comparison. RLAs are required statewide beginning with the November 2026 election.

Sample Size: The number of ballots needed to confirm an election outcome to a specific level of statistical confidence.

Seed: A number used to generate a pseudo-random number sequence that determines which ballots will be hand-counted for the RLA.

Target Contest: A target contest is the contest selected for an RLA. The margin of victory in the target contest determines the number of ballots that must be inspected and is used to determine if the RLA has met the risk limit. There can be one or more target contests.



Appendix B

SAMPLE AUDIT FILES

Example Audit Board Credential

Keep Secure!
Share these login credentials with audit board members only.
Do not post publicly.

Audit Board #1

Scan this QR code to log in to Arlo:



Alternatively, you can use this link:

https://arlo.voting.works/auditboard/detached-exposure-steed-scalded

Example Ballot Labels

Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 24 Batch: Aquarius	Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 54 Batch: Aquarius	Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 100 Batch: Aquarius
Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 105 Batch: Aquarius	Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 16 Batch: Aries	Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 65 Batch: Aries
Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 123 Batch: Aries	Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 15 Batch: Gemini	Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 51 Batch: Gemini
Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 145 Batch: Gemini	Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 151 Batch: Gemini	Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 213 Batch: Gemini
Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 15 Batch: Leo	Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 25 Batch: Leo	Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 190 Batch: Leo
Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 42 Batch: Pices	Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 128 Batch: Pices	Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 39 Batch: Taurus
Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 66 Batch: Taurus	Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 67 Batch: Taurus	Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 68 Batch: Taurus
Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 83 Batch: Taurus	Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 89 Batch: Taurus	Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 114 Batch: Taurus
Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 210 Batch: Taurus	Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 33 Batch: Virgo	Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 55 Batch: Virgo
Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 85 Batch: Virgo	Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 124 Batch: Virgo	Audit Board #1 - Ballot Number: 153 Batch: Virgo

Example Placeholder Sheet

Audit Board #1

Batch: Aquarius

Ballot Number: 54



Appendix C

CHAPTER 127 OF THE TEXAS ELECTION CODE

SUBCHAPTER I. RISK-LIMITING AUDIT

Sec. 127.301. APPLICABILITY OF SUBCHAPTER. This subchapter applies to an election:

(1) that occurs after August 31, 2026;

(2) that contains a race or measure that is voted on statewide; and

(3) in which an auditable voting system described by Section 129.003(a) is used.

Added by Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 573 (S.B. 598), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2021.

Sec. 127.302. RISK-LIMITING AUDIT. (a) The general custodian of election records shall participate in a risk-limiting audit for one or more selected statewide races or measures. The custodian shall begin the audit on a date prescribed by the secretary of state.

(a-1) All counties holding an election subject to this subchapter must participate in the risk-limiting audit on the selected statewide races or measures as provided by this section, regardless of the method of counting voted ballots used by the county.

(b) The secretary of state shall select, in accordance with rules adopted by the secretary, the precincts to be counted and the offices or propositions to be counted.

(c) The general custodian of election records shall complete the audit on the date prescribed by the secretary of state.

(d) The general custodian of election records shall post a notice of the date, hour, and place of the audit in the custodian's office and on the county's Internet website, if the county maintains a website.

(e) A watcher may be present for the audit if appointed by a candidate in the election. A watcher must deliver a certificate of appointment to the general custodian of election records at the time the watcher reports for service. The certificate must be in writing and must include:

(1) the printed name and signature of the watcher;

(2) the election subject to the audit; and

(3) the printed name and signature of the candidate making the appointment.

(f) The secretary of state may appoint personnel to assist with the audit, including applicable voting system technicians or representatives and persons who have assisted with the design and implementation of the audit.

Added by Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 573 (S.B. 598), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2021.
Amended by: Acts 2025, 89th Leg., R.S., Ch. 992 (S.B. 827), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2025.

Sec. 127.303. RULES. (a) The secretary of state shall adopt rules prescribing procedures necessary to implement this subchapter.

(b) Rules adopted under this subchapter must include a rule, using widely accepted statistical methods, that provides for the number or percentage of paper records that must be counted in a risk-limiting audit under Section 127.302.

Added by Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 573 (S.B. 598), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2021.

Sec. 127.304. PUBLICATION OF RESULTS. The results of a risk-limiting audit conducted under this subchapter must be published on the Internet website of the secretary of state not later than three days after the completion of the audit.

Added by Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 573 (S.B. 598), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2021.

For expiration of this section, see Subsection (e).

Sec. 127.305. PILOT PROGRAM. (a) Notwithstanding Section 127.301(1), the secretary of state shall conduct a pilot program, beginning with the election taking place November 8, 2022, of the risk-limiting audit program created under this subchapter.

(b) The secretary of state shall select at least five counties to participate in the pilot program. At least one county participating in the pilot program must have a population of at least 500,000.

(c) After each election conducted under the pilot program, the secretary of state shall send a detailed report to each member of the legislature evaluating the success of the program and making a recommendation as to whether the legislature should act to delay the statewide implementation of the program.

(d) The secretary of state shall adopt rules as necessary to implement this section.

(e) This section expires August 31, 2026.

Added by Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 573 (S.B. 598), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2021.

Sec. 127.306. WAIVER NOT PERMITTED. The secretary of state may not waive any requirements of this subchapter.

Added by Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 573 (S.B. 598), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2021.



Texas Secretary *of* State
Elections Division

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